| Summary |
The U.S. Supreme Court recently revisited the landmark 1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona and held that the Supreme Court's decision in that case still stands. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies in custodial interrogation and that custodial confessions are inadmissible in court if the proper warnings were not given beforehand.
The Supreme Court recently decided the case of Kansas v. Glover, in which the defendant argued that the police had violated his Miranda rights by not informing him of his right to counsel before questioning him. The Supreme Court concluded that with regards to post-arrest questioning, the lack of counsel cannot be presumed and the defendant must be advised of the right to counsel before questioning begins, per the Miranda ruling.
The Court also held that the failure to provide such warnings does not necessarily make all subsequent evidence or confessions inadmissible, but rather the prosecution must show that such evidence was not obtained as a result of the failure. In other words, the prosecution must show that the evidence or confession was obtained independent of the failure to warn of the right to counsel.
The ruling from the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Glover serves as a reminder of the importance of the Miranda ruling and the protections in place for individuals subject to custodial interrogations. It also serves to reinforce the principle that the failure to provide proper warnings is not always fatal to the case. Instead, evidence and confessions obtained from custodial interrogations may still be admissible if such evidence is shown to have been obtained independently of the failure to warn of the right to counsel.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Glover is an important reminder that the principles established in Miranda v. Arizona remain relevant today. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is still applicable in cases of custodial interrogations, and individuals must be properly informed of their right to counsel before questioning begins. Furthermore, the failure to provide such warnings is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case and evidence obtained from such interrogations may be admissible if the prosecution is able to show that the evidence was obtained independently of such failure.
In summary, the recent Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. Glover is yet another example of the ongoing relevance and importance of the Supreme Court's Miranda v. Arizona decision. The principle of providing warnings for custodial interrogations is still firmly in place, and evidence and confessions may still be admissible if the prosecution is able to establish that such evidence was obtained independently of the failure to provide such warnings.
Protecting Your Rights in the Criminal Justice System
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona is one of the best known and important pieces of criminal justice legislation in the United States. Established in 1966, the Miranda rule ensures that individuals under arrest or custodial interrogation by law enforcement are informed of their Fifth Amendment rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel.The Miranda ruling has become the cornerstone of legal protection for individuals in the criminal justice system and has been elevated to near-legendary status by its presence in countless seemingly endless reruns of police dramas on TV and in movies.
Why the Miranda Rule Was Established
In the 1960s, the Miranda ruling was necessary because police officers were routinely taking advantage of criminal suspects who had no legal training and no knowledge of their legal rights. Police officers would unlawfully question suspects while they were being held in custody and then use any information gained in the interrogation against them in court.Although the Miranda ruling has been upheld by the Supreme Court, it has been weakened and amended a number of times since it was first established. In the years since 1966, legal scholars and police professional organizations have argued for and against the Miranda ruling, and its continued relevance has been debated in legal circles up to the present day.
It probably is needless to recall the high court's 5-4 opinion in the 1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona. For the record: Ernesto Miranda, a 23-year-old itinerant, was charged with kidnapping and rape. After two hours of questioning, he confessed. The confession was admitted as evidence. Miranda was found guilty and sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison.
It is not clear whether Miranda had been warned that anything he said could be used against him, but clearly he had not been advised of his right to counsel. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote an interminable opinion in which he and his colleagues reversed Miranda's conviction (and the convictions of three other appellants in parallel cases).
Justice Tom Clark, dissenting, said Warren had gone "too far." Justice John Marshall Harlan, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White, also dissented. They criticized Warren's opinion as "poor constitutional law that entails harmful consequences for the country at large." For good or ill — mostly good — prosecutors have been stuck with Miranda ever since.
Monday's order in the Supreme Court, granting review in the case of Leeander Jerome Blake, provides an example of Miranda on steroids. These are the undisputed facts:
On Sept. 19, 2002, someone shot and killed Straughan Lee Griffin in front of his home in Annapolis, Md. There were two assailants. They stole Griffin's automobile and ran over his body as they fled the scene. Police soon arrested Terrence Tolbert; he was convicted two months ago for his role in the crime and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. A month after the crime in 2002, Tolbert implicated Blake. Anne Arundel County police went to Blake's home at 4:30 a.m. They arrested him on charges of first-degree murder, armed robbery and carjacking. Blake was then 17 years and 8 months old.
At headquarters, detective William Johns advised Blake orally of his Miranda rights, i.e., his right to remain silent, to have a lawyer at his side, and so on. The boy said he wanted an attorney and would not answer questions until he got one. Johns gave him (1) a copy of his Miranda rights and (2) a form detailing the charges against him. Mistakenly, the form indicated that Blake, if found guilty, could be punished by death. (Under Maryland law, capital punishment applies only to persons over 18.)
As Johns turned to leave, officer Curtis Reese made a gratuitous remark to the defendant: "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" Trying to undo the damage, Johns immediately said, loudly, "No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now." The officers left, but when Johns returned a half-hour later to give Blake some clothes. Blake was ready to talk. He waived his right to an attorney and confessed his involvement in the crime.
Before long, as you will have guessed, Blake's lawyer successfully moved in the county circuit court to suppress his statements under the Miranda rules. In May of last year, Maryland's Court of Appeals agreed: Blake's statements after he requested a lawyer cannot be admitted at trial. "The motion to suppress was properly granted."
Speaking for a unanimous court, Judge Irma Raker seized upon officer Reese's suggestion to the defendant: "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" It was more of a comment than a question, but the court held that it "amounted to the functional equivalent of interrogation." Given the totality of circumstances — the pre-dawn arrest, the threat of death, the failure to provide counsel after Blake had requested an attorney — the evidence was o-u-t.
I don't know what evidence the state could provide, apart from the statements. Blake's counsel, Kenneth W. Ravenell of Baltimore, says there is none. Maybe yes, maybe no, but something is surely amiss when one offhand remark from one cop may let this defendant go free.
For the record, I began covering a police beat as a cub reporter in 1941. Remembering those pre-Miranda days, I would agree that Earl Warren's spread-eagled opinion has done much more good than harm. Even so, its application in Blake's case strikes me as a stretch too far. The evidence was fairly obtained. Let it in!
(Letters to Mr. Kilpatrick should be sent by e-mail to kilpatjj@aol.com.)
COPYRIGHT 2005 UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE
This feature may not be reproduced or distributed electronically, in print or otherwise without the written permission of uclick and Universal Press Syndicate.
